The official reactions from Kinshasa to Uvira’s fall—notably those of Patrick Muyaya, Minister of Communication and Media and government spokesperson, and Thérèse Kayikwamba Wagner, Minister of Foreign Affairs—as before stayed largely confined to calls for international condemnation and action. This despite past experiences, which had fully demonstrated the limitations of such an essentially declaratory and outward-looking approach.

On the Rwandan side, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Olivier Nduhungirehe, followed by the President of the Republic, Paul Kagame, repeated a wellknown trope that responsibility for the capture of Uvira lies with the DRC, which they accuse of cooperating with the FDLR and the Burundian army. The Rwandans allege that AFC/M23’s actions are motivated by the need to protect the Tutsi population, who are framed as victims massacred by Congolese authorities and their armed partners.

Meanwhile, part of the international community repeated rhetorical calls for peace—to respect agreements and prioritize dialogue—that have become tiresome for the victims of war. Some actors, such as United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, explicitly condemned the AFC/M23 and Rwanda. Others, such as Belgium, adopted a more cautious stance that calls for compliance with existing agreements without clearly identifying those responsible or taking firm measures. Despite a recent and rare firmness from the US government, international efforts have repeatedly proved incapable of producing significant deterrent effects on the ground. The AFC/M23 did announce that it would voluntarily withdraw from Uvira on December 16 under certain conditions and eventually did so in January 2026, which suggests that US pressure is bearing some fruit, though such a political gesture is likely to have little influence on the wider conflict.

All these international actors—whether calling for peace with courage or caution—fail to outline the practical terms for achieving this peace, given the existing balance of power and interests at stake. In other words, recycling pious injunctions and worn-out formulas for peace, does not bring us closer the prospects for peace in the Great Lakes region

In the following pages, we defend three theses. First, unlike previous conflicts and negotiation processes in the DRC, the current sequence is unique due to the drastically reduced options available for negotiation. This impasse stems from the complexity of the conflict, the limitations of the international response, and a global realignment toward a more transactional understanding of peace. Secondly, this narrowing of possibilities leads to two brutal outcomes: either the intervention of a significantly larger military force capable of ending the conflict without provoking a further escalation of violence, or the tacit acceptance of continued regional unrest and the lasting normalization of war. Thirdly, we show why it has become imperative today to impose of a strong peace rooted in sovereignty and the consolidation of a robust state. We argue that the state is the only player capable of articulating competing claims, producing politically negotiable compromises, and subjecting the use of force to constitutional, legal, and international constraints.”